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Two Constraints on Interpreting 
Laurent Stern 
We interpret scientific, legal. historical, literary or religious docu­
ments. Our concept of interpretation and our conception of the 
interpreting activity are independent of the field or subject matter 
where interpretations are required. Two claims about interpreting are 
at cross-purposes: that it relies on discovery and that it is a normative 
enterprise. We not only discover what was said in a given document, 
we also construe what was said to demonstrate its value for a given 
purpose. What can be discovered provides one constraint on inter­
preting, what brings out its value for a gi ven application provides 
another constraint. Conflict between these two constraints yields an 
incentive for creativity and invention in interpreting. 
I 
Given the right context, clouds mean rain and spots mean measles. 
Natural signs are said to be interpreted . This use of 'interpreting' and 
'interpretation' shall not be discussed here. We shall focus on prob­
lems in interpreting written documents. The results of this discussion 
can be applied with suitable changes to an examination of problems in 
the interpretation of conventional signs, art works, social institutions 
and human actions. Only about such interpretanda can we raise ques­
tions concerning the beliefs and desires of those who traced these 
signs, wrote these documents, created these art works, brought about 
or made use of these social institutions and performed these actions. 
When asked about one of these interpretanda "What is it!" or "What 
does it say!" we answer by indicating a point of view, a principle of 
organization and an elucidation of relevant concepts. The background 
conditions and assumptions of what was presented and the point of 
what was said are made plain in our answer. The questions indicate 
chat the reader or viewer did not immediately understand what was 
presented to him. Our answers are interpretations. We expect that 
our answers will permit and facilitate the understanding of what was 
presented and establish its value for a given purpose. Our recommen­
dations about a point of view, a principle of organization and a claim 
as to what a text is about from a given point of view can be felicitous 
and pertinent or infelicitous and irrelevant, but they cannot be true or 
false. Other claims about the background conditions, assumptions 
and the elucidation of concepts can be true or false. 
Ordinarily we become aware of interpreting in the context of a need 
for an interpretation. Such a need arises typically when a point of 
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view, a principle of organi:ation, or background conditions and 
assumptions that lead to the understanding of a given text are no 
longer available for a potential audience of that text. There are no 
conventional signs, sentences or texts that can be understood inde, 
pendently of any precondition. But we do not ask for the spelling out 
of these conditions any more than a bilingual asks for a translation 
from one to the other language that he understands. The fact that we 
do not raise questions concerning an interpretation if these conditions 
are familiar to us does not imply that such questions cannot be raised. 
Rei nterpretations are always possible and very often desirable. Inter, 
pretations and reinteifpretations have different purposes. Reinterpreta­
tions displace familiar preconditions for the purpose of securing new 
audiences for a given text. By securing a new audience, interpreters 
serve the survival of texts. 
11  
In interpreting a sign, do we understand it as the user who traced this 
sign understood it! This question cannot be asked about natural signs. 
We interpret conventional signs, texts, art works, social institutions 
or human actions if and only if it makes sense to ask whether our 
understanding of these interpretanda agrees with the understanding of 
those who traced or used the signs, recorded the texts, created the art 
works, created or made use of social institutions or performed the 
actions. About a conventional sign or written document it always 
makes sense to ask: what does it say and how must we understand 
what it says? About a social institution or human action it always 
makes sense to ask: what is its goal or purpose? Natural signs are 
sometimes misidentified as conventional signs. Cracks in the wall are 
seen as handwriting on the wall. In cases of such misidentification we 
ask the same two questions we asked about conventional signs. The 
range of possible answers is provided by satisfactory explanations 
concerning the use a member of a language community could make of 
a given sequence of signs. The major task of interpreting, according to 
some theorists, consists in identifying what a given message says and 
how the sender understood what it says. 
But if this is indeed the major task of interpreting then the success, 
ful performance of this task yields a normative claim that a given 
interpretation is the best available account of what was said and how 
it was understood by whoever said it. But the best available account 
may not illuminate how what was said was understood by whoever 
said it. According to Quentin Skinner, 1 
no agent can eventually be said to have meant or 
done something which he could never be brought to 
accept as a correct description of what he had meant 
or done. This special authority of an agent over his 
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intentions . . .  exclude( s) the possibiliry that an ade-
quate account of an agent's behavior could ever sur-
vive the demonsrration that it was itself dependent 
on the use of criteria of description and classification 
not available to the agent himself. 
Skinner's remark has a poiint. Agreement between an author or 
agent and an interpreter about what was said or done is indeed a 
necessary condition of understanding. But must interpretations fit the 
texts or must the texts fit the interpretations? Suppose we are told 
that members of an ancient rribe believed that the earth rests on an 
elephant. Did they believe something about this earth that is part of 
our solar system?2 Was their belief about a large African or Southern 
Asian land mammal? Granted that our use of 'earth' and 'elephant' are 
dependent on criteria of description and classification that were not 
available to members of that ancient rribe. But what were they talking 
about when they talked about elephants and the earth? The interpreter 
may at this point admit that he does not know what they were talking 
about. This may be the best available comment about what they said. 
Or he may tell a story that makes sense of the beliefs attributed to 
members of that tribe. 
There are no other alternatives. Interpreters may claim, of course, 
chat members of that rribe talked about the earth, but either their 
conception of the earth was different from ours or they had mistaken 
�liefs about the earth. But these claims are merely part of a story that 
makes sense of the reported beliefs. Typically, such stories are inter­
pretations. As mentioned earlier, we become aware of the need for an 
interpretation, if we do not immediately understand what is reported. 
A reported belief that is not only mistaken but by our own lights 
obviously mistaken prompts further awareness of the need for an 
interpretation. The purpose of such an interpretation is to explain or 
explain away the disagreement between the reported beliefs and our 
beliefs. Unless the reported beliefs are fitted within a web of beliefs 
that agrees with our own fundamental beliefs, we cannot understand 
what was reported. We interpret texts, because we do not undetstand 
them or because they seem unreasonable by our lights. The interpre­
ter•s own standards are decisive about what is accepted as reasonable. 
Interpretations make sense of what is unreasonable by these stand­
ards. As a result of the interpretation, the interpreter understands 
what was not previously understood. But we must remember that the 
agreement between texts and interpretation is brought about by fitting 
the texts to the interpreter's standards and not the other way around. 
Interpreters invented non-literal, metaphorical� allegorical or symboli­
cal readings of ancient texts, precisely because these texts had to be 
fitted to the interpreters' standards of what is reasonable. Violence in 
text interpretations is common,3 but contrary to Skinner's claim, it 
does not always defeat the interpretation. Why is this so? 
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If direct quotation could lead to the understanding of a given text, an 
interpretation of that text would not be needed . Even minimal inter­
pretations of texts must indicate or imply not only what was said but 
also the point of what was said. Interpretations may go even further 
and tell us what an author wanted to say in saying what he said. In tht 
most favorable case, we maintain that the author actually said what ht 
wanted to say and that our claims about the point of what he said are 
warranted by his text.We do not read into the lines or between the 
lines; we direct our attention only to what the author confesses and 
we disregard what he betrays. But we must notice that even in these 
favorable cases, in claiming what the author wanted to say we are 
guided by what we believe about what is talked about and by what is 
reasonable by our standards. If the author disagrees with our beliefs, 
we claim that he holds true what is false, we postulate that he has a 
false belief. If he agrees with one of our beliefs, we claim that he has a 
true belief. Guided by our beliefs and our standards, we attribute rea­
sons to the author for saying what he said. The reasons that we attrib­
ute to the author illuminate the point of what he said and what he 
wanted to say. In throwing light upon the point of what the author 
said, we are offering an account of what is said in a text and we dem­
onstrate its value for a predetermined purpose. Our interpretation 
must be defended against two kinds of claims: ( 1 ) that we are mis­
taken about the point of what is said in that text, and ( 2 )  a different 
understanding of that text would serve its purposes better. 
In the practice of interpreting we are often urged to understand 
what authors wanted to say and to understand them better than they 
understood themselves.4 It can be argued that violence in text inter­
pn:talion is introduced as soon as in.terpreters talk about the point of 
what an author said or what he wanted to say rather than about what 
he said. But this kind of violence is neither sufficient to defeat a given 
interpretation nor is it always detected. However, if it is notked, it 
can contribute to the defeat of an interpretation. Since interpreters are 
guided by their own beliefs and standards of reasonableness, it is not 
surprising that past generations' violence in the practice of interpreta­
tion is more readily detected than our own. Among historians of phi .. 
losophy or historians of ideas it is a common complaint that their 
predecessors provided not only mistaken but misleading interpreta­
tions of classical authors. Secondly, interpreters may convince us that 
in making sense out of a text by their own lights they merely say what 
the author of that text would have said had he been in possession of 
his interpreters' wisdom. We reinterpret these texts only if we do not 
admit that the wisdom of interpreters of a bygone age was equal to 
our own. 
In interpreting we are guided by what is the case and what is being 
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talked about. These claims are not resrricted to a given philosophical 
rradition. Gadamer speaks about being guided by "die Stu.·he selbsr"5 
and Davidson by "a general agreement on beliefs.'>e For two reasons 
these claims provide more effective consrraints on interpreting than 
Skinner's suggestions mentioned above. ( 1 )  We cannot always distin­
guish between what an agenlt had meant or done and what he had 
brought about. From a historical perspective, what had been meant or 
done is always seen in the light of what had been brought about. (2)  It 
is up to us to decide whether our ancestors could be brought to 
accept our story of what they brought about. Since we ascribe to them 
the beliefs, purposes and desires that brought about the events that 
happened, an additional claim that they would agree with our specula­
tions and interpretations is an empty gesture. 
IV 
It is the main purpose of interpreting to make available for our use 
what we previously did not understand. What was alien becomes nat­
uralized; what was srrange becomes domesticated. In interpreting we 
are offering access to the understanding or appreciation of a text that 
would otherwise remain unfamiliar. We are offering the same access 
to a text that is in evident need of an interpretation as we have to 
other texts that are in no obvious need of interpretation or where 
such a need is merely latent. The expected use and the significance of 
a given text guide and inform the interpreting activity: religious doc­
uments are interpreted to provide guidance for religious practice; 
literary art works to afford entertainment, amusement or aesthetic 
delight; scientific rreatises to contribute to the information about the 
world in which we live. Just as interlingual translation permits under­
standing in our own language of what was said in an unfamiliar for­
eign language, intralingual interpretation facilitates understanding of 
what was previously strange. We interpret what was previously famil­
iar only if we reinterpret. Reinterpretations offer a radically new 
viewpoint or organizational principle that permits our seeing a given 
text in a thoroughly new light. 
If indeed naturalization of what was alien is the main purpose of 
interpreting then it is understandable that we do not interpret what is 
obvious. Further, if by a successful interpretation we gain the same 
access to a given text as we have to other texts that are not in need of 
interpretation, we can expect to find successful interpretations to be 
unobrrusive. Once we have understood a given text through a success­
ful interpretation, the interpretation can become unobtrusive to the 
point that we come to believe that we have accepted a description of 
what is said in that text rather than an interpretation. Even interpre­
ters well-known for counteracting in their practice the ideal of unob­
trusive interpretations pay homage to this ideal. uThe elucidation of a 
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poem"-wrote Heidegger-" must strive to make itself superfluous. 
The last, but also most difficult step of every interpretation is this: to 
disappear with its elucidations before the pure presence of the 
poem.'"7 
If we understand a text and apply what we have understood for a 
predetermined purpose, we reach a practical goal of interpreting. 
Without such a practical goal interpreting could continue. A simple 
consideration may be illuminating here. If every sentence or text must 
be understood within the context of iits preconditions, then, even if 
we do no more in interpreting than spell out these conditions. there is 
no reason to believe that we can understand the interpretive commen­
tary independently of its preconditions. The interpretive commentary 
invites further commentary in a chain that need not end with any suc­
cessive commentary. Moreover, the very first link of that chain may 
be discarded in favor of another interpretation, thus introducing 
another chain of interpretive commentaries. Accordingly, there is no 
theoretically satisfactory limit to interpreting: interpretation can go 
on. Of course, for practical reasons we may discontinue interpreting, 
but any accepted terminal point of this activity is merely a resting 
place that satisfies us from the viewpoint of our immediate needs, 
desires, expectations and beliefs; it is not a theoretically satisfactory 
terminal point that is independent of such beliefs and expectations. 
"What happens is not"-according to Wittgenstein- uthat this sym­
bol cannot be further interpreted , but: I do no interpreting. I do not 
interpret, because l feel at home in the present picture!'8 
For similar reasons, there is no theoretically satisfactory first move 
within the interpreting activity. Since the understanding of any con­
stituent part of a sentence or text is already dependent on the precon­
ditions of that constituent part, interpretation does not start with part 
of a text pure and uninterpreted. Yet nothing is more common than 
the wide claim that the interpreting activity has a theoretically satisfy­
ing first and last move. Interpreters who claim to show what is said in 
a text are oblivious to the fact that their claims may be merely what 
the conventional wisdom of their own time admits concerning that 
text. But an interpreter's conventional wisdom at a given time may 
not be the same as the conventional wisdom of other interpreters at 
other times. 
But there is deeper trouble here. We must take it for granted that 
just as descriptions must be independent of what they describe, inter­
pretations also must be independent of what they interpret. We must 
be able to distinguish between an interpretation and what it is the 
interpretation of. If this distinction cannot be established, if there are 
no rock bottom facts that remain invariant even i n  a controversy con­
cerning the interpretation of these facts, then it would even be mis­
leading to speak about competing interpretations. However, while we 
may be able to establish this distinction in the context of each particu-
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lar case of interpretation. we cannot provide a theoretical foundation 
for the interpreting activity that would establish and justify this dis­
tinction for all cases of interpreting. 
The understanding and access to a text provided by the interpreting 
acriviry admits of degrees. Typically, teachers strive for what they 
consider a deeper or better understanding of a text than would be 
avoilable to their students. lt will be granted that each reader's knowl­
edge or ignorance of the background conditions and assumptions of a 
given text will determine that reader's understanding of that text. 
Depending on a given reader's degree of understanding of a text, that 
reader may need, admit or reject further interpretation. The diversity 
among texts and among degrees of understanding of the same text by 
all kinds of readers makes the discovery of a theoretical foundation 
that would determine the relation between interpretations and what 
they are interpretations of implausible. 
v 
Our formative notions of interpreting become diffuse, unless we focus 
on cases where there is a need for an interpretation. But as soon as we 
understand the interpreting activity, we may disregard the connection 
between the need to interpret and the activity of interpreting. We gain 
thereby a more comprehensive notion of interpreting that admits two 
kinds of theories of interpretation: unrestricted or 'oceanic' theories 
and restricted theories.9 According to unrestricted or (oceanic' theor­
ies, what we claim is said in a text is always determined by an inter­
pretation: wriitten texts or utterances cannot be understood prior to 
interpretation. If we believe that we understand a given text without 
interpreting it, we merely rely on a past interpretation of that text. 
Restricted theories of interpretation hold that at least in some cases 
interpretations do not determine what is said in a text. Examples for 
these two contrasting theories can be found in the views of Heidegger 
and Wittgenstein. Both philosophers discuss their theories of inter­
pretation in the context of the 1 . . .  as' locution. Heidegger defends the 
wide claim that all cases of understanding are cases of understanding 
as and all cases of seeing are cases of seeing as. Wittgenstein aims at a 
distinction between 'seeing' and 'seeing as' and restricts interpreta­
tions to cases of seeing as. Restricted theories of interpretation aim at 
a careful distinction between interpreting and understanding; 'oceanic' 
theories advance the claim that the understanding of every text or 
utterance requires interpretation. 
According to both theories, a given text that is interpreted has an 
intentional character. This does not imply that we must discover what 
the historical author of that text wanted to say while producing it, 
what mental state brought it about, what were the historical author's 
beliefs, desires, expectations or fears. The starting point of the inter-
8
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preter's inquiry is a text: what message would anyone want to com­
municate with that text� Within a wide range of possible answers, 
each satisfactory answer would explain what use a member of a lan­
guage community could make of a given sequence of signs. letters, 
words or sentences that were available to him within his language. 
Concerning each answer, the interpreter must be prepared to defend 
the claim that he is reading what another person wanted to communi­
cate with these marks. His answer would be discredited if it could be 
proven that he read into a text what he established by hindsight and 
what could not have been available to the author of that text. 
A second presupposition of interpreting may be considered more 
controversial. According to restricted theories of interpretation, if a 
reader did know all assumptions, beliefs and background conditions 
that permit the understanding of a given text, he would not need an 
interpretation of that text. But if none of these background conditions 
are available, the interpreter must at least assume that the text he is 
interpreting contains or indicates a somewhat consistent and at least 
partially true set of beliefs.10 In practice this requirement will be 
adjusted to account for stories, jokes, lies, irony and parts of speech 
that are not ordinarily understood as either true or false. It will be 
further adjusted to account for symbolical, metaphorical, allegorical 
and even unsound expressions of quite rational human needs, emo­
tions, desires, wishes, hopes or fears. Interpretations begin from the 
interprete'rs' perspectives. If this precondition of interpreting is not 
satisfied and interpreters cannot assume that the texts they confront 
are by their own standards at least partially consistent and contain or 
indicate some beliefs they can share, they may be able to recite what is 
written in these texts, but they can neither understand nor interpret 
them. 
However, if the preconditions of interpreting are satisfied and all 
available evidence has been accounted for, interpreters must fit their 
own concepts to the text they confront and make sense out of that 
text. The discovery of the available evidence and the invention of 
concepts that are fitted to a given text lead to interpretations that can 
at least compete against alternatives. But no alternative interpretation 
can provide us with a determinate sense of a text that is independent 
of an interpreter's perspective, standards of rationality and conceptual 
framework. 
VI 
The evidence that can be discovered about a given text provides one 
constraint on interpreting. It will be admitted that the conventions of 
language use, and the shared practices associated with such use deter­
mine what is said in a given text. Also, writers rely on these conven­
tions and practices in communicating with their audiences even when 
9
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expressing unconventional and idiosyncratic beliefs. Accordingly, our 
interpretations are informed by the attribution of plausible beliefs and 
intentions as foundations of a given text. However, the beliefs we 
attribute to a writer and what we take his words to mean are interde­
pendent. To the extent that the choice between belief and meaning is 
underdetermined by the available evidence, there are no facts about 
which we can be right or wrong in determining the meaning of what 
was written. 1 1  Reasons can support or defeat a given choice in attri­
buting meaning to a text and belief to its author. But, since every 
choice is underdetermined by the available evidence, there cannot be a 
theory decisively supporting one choice rather than another. Accord­
ingly, all the evidence about a text that is available for discovery can­
not prove the validity of its interpretation. 
Interpretations are indeterminate. The normative character of 
interpreting reinforces the indeterminacy of interpretations. The 
interpreter's claim that a given text is valuable for a predetermined 
purpose is often in conflict with the evidence that can be discovered 
about that text. Such conflicts provide grounds for radical reinterpre­
tations of texts. Creativity and invention play an important role in 
such radical reinterpretations. They provide non-literal interpretations 
for the purpose of demonstrating the value of a given text. Examples 
are the allegorical interpretations of Homer and the Hebrew Bible. l l  
In cases of such radical reinterpretations, claims are attributed to a 
text that are in the view of its naive or conservative readers not only 
false but obviously false. These claims are wholly dependent upon the 
interpretation. Finally, these non-literal interpretations are offered in 
defense of the 'spirif of the text. 
Since interpretations are indeterminate, they are essentially contes­
table. They can be felicitous and pertinent or infelicitous and irrele­
vant for a predetermined purpose, but not true or false independent 
of any purpose. Interpreting is a normative enterprise. Even if radical 
reinterpretations are not always required, we rely on the interpreter's 
creativity to demonstrate a text's value for a predetermined purpose. 
In interpreting we offer a point of view or principles of organizing the 
constituent parts of a given text, which enables our audience to 
understand it and to appreciate its value for a given purpose. We 
invite our audience to read that text from the perspective and within 
the context that we present and we support our reading by an implied 
claim that it is a better reading than the available alternatives. A point 
of view, a principle of organization, a claim what a text is about from 
a given point of view and an invitation to the best available reading of 
a text are not the sorts of things that could be regarded as true, cor­
rect or accurate. Yet, these claims are sometimes registered on behalf 
of interpretations that are supported. Opponents are polemically 
charged with offering false, incorrect or inaccurate interpretations. 
They are said to misinterpret a given text. 
10
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However, even if we do not defend these claims. we need not dis­
card the intuitions that form their background. If we wish to discover 
what a given text is about, we cannot be satisfied with anything less 
than true presuppositions in interpreting. If they are unavailable or 
their guidance is rejected, interpreters invent what was said in that 
text. Such interpretations are constrained only by an interpreter's 
perspective and standard of rationality. and by an implied claim about 
the value of that text for a predetermined purpose . Discovery and 
invention in interpreting are not sharply separated. Also, there are no 
interpretations that are the exclusive result of either discovery or of 
invention. Further, we may be mistaken in believing that our interpre­
tations result from discovery rather than invention or the other way 
around. As mentioned above, we discover evidence pointing to the 
use of language, the background conditions and assumptions of a 
given text. But the concepts used in understanding ancient texts are 
part of an interpreter's conceptual framework; they are certainly not 
waiting to be discovered among the data of a given subject matter. At 
best, these concepts fit the facts within that subject matter. 
Wherever invention plays the predominant role, discovery cannot 
be excluded either. For suppose an interpretation is made up in the 
absence of or contrary to the available evidence. Such an interpreta, 
tion can be rejected for a number of reasons. The connection between 
an interpretation and what it is the interpretation of is not established; 
or, the interpreter merely reads his interpretation by hindsight into 
the text and what he offers us is a projection of his own views onto 
the text and not an interpretation; or, what the author of that text 
wanted to communicate is obscured and what he wrote is merely used 
as grist for the interpreter's mill. Such interpretations will not prevail 
against available alternatives, for the interpreter's inventions are not 
connected with the evidence that can be discovered among the data of 
a given subject matter. 
Discovery and invention are both at work not only when we are 
concerned with historical documents but also when we interpret reli­
gious documents or literary art works. The literary critic's interpreting 
activity is focused on literary art works that are convention,governed: 
language is used here to create and to talk about literary characters, 
places and events. The discovery of the conventional features of the 
language used and of the relevant interpretive conventions provides 
guidance for our interpretations of a given literary text. Within these 
wide limits interpretations are invented and as long as they fit that 
text they can at least compete with alternative interpretations. 
Religious documents are neither understood as historical docu, 
ments nor as literary art works. What distinguishes different interpre, 
tations of religious documents is not primarily that in one interpreta# 
tion a given document is anchored in history and in another it is 
treated merely as a story. Theists and agnostics need not disagree 
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about the historical foundation of parts of the Bible. Even Bible­
cenrered religious believers may agree with agnostics on rhe lack of 
historical significance of large parts of the Bible. Differ�nt interpreta­
tions of religious documents can be distinguished by reference to the 
interpretive communities where they are native or where they have 
been adopted. The traditions. beliefs and practices of interpretive 
communiries are among the dara chat can be discovered when we are 
confronted with religious documents. Within these limits interpreta­
tions are invented and they may compete with alternative interpreta­
tions within one and the same interpretive community. 
VII 
What can be discovered within a given text limits the range of com­
peting interpretations. Our choice among them will depend on our 
beliefs and interests. What is invented and fitted to the text will be 
either accommodated to our beliefs or to an alternative system of 
beliefs that we adopt. However, whether we are interpreting to 
domesticate what was previously unfamiliar or reinterpreting to disthe 
face familiar, we must postulate a background of shared assumptions 
and beliefs between interpreters and authors of texts or creators of art 
works. Disagreements about beliefs become intelligible only against 
the background of such shared assumptions. 
Interpreters confronted with texts that originated in historically 
remote times or in geographically faraway places have several choices. 
They may ascribe their own beliefs to the authors of these texts, or 
they may assign them beliefs that they consider reasonable. Following 
this road, they will understand or- infer what is written in accordance 
with the attributed beliefs. On the other hand, based on their under­
standing of the constituent parts of a given text, they may also offer 
an account of what is written in that text, and infer the authors' rele­
vant beliefs-no matter how bizarre these beliefs are. This option has 
been discouraged by maxims of interpretive charity, urged at least 
since Vico: beliefs in alien cultures must be understood so that thev 
come out to be reasonable in the context of what members of these 
cultures have been taught and what they experien<;:ed. But charity is 
not only recommended, it is a precondition of interpreting. For if we 
cannot assume that a given text that we interpret contains or indicates 
a partially consistent and true set of beliefs, we can neither interpret 
nor understand it. 
Traditionalists among interpreters will attempt to keep texts alive 
by ascribing their beliefs or what they cons.ider reasonable beliefs to 
the authors of these texts. Allegorical interpretations of Homer and 
the Bible exemplify this procedure. Iconoclasts will reject texts that 
disagree with what in their view are reasonable beliefs. Marcion 1s 
rejection of the Old Testament and parts of the New Testament is a 
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case in point. Finally. nontraditionalist contemporary inrerprerers, 
especially among literary critics, will preserve texts by finding their 
own views exemplified by what is written. What is written about 
recedes inro rhe background, while what is written exemplifies a fun, 
damental insight that can be traced to Freud, Heidegger. Levi,Strauss 
or others. 
VIII 
Interpretations are indeterminate, if every choice in attributing mean, 
ing to a text and belief to its author is underdetermined by the availa· 
ble evidence and interpreting is a normative enterprise. Interpretations 
are indeterminate for a third reason. What we can discover about 
interpretanda permits us to rule out interpretations that are conua­
dicted by the evidence. But an integral component of every interpreta­
tion that is consistent with the evidence is contributed by the inter­
preter. Since the interpreter's perspective and conceptual framework 
cannot be ruled out, the validity of a given interpretation cannot be 
demonstrated to the satisfaction of those who do not share that per­
spective. But even with two interpreters of the same text who share a 
given perspective one may attempt to explain what is written as meta­
phor or allegory and claim that the text expresses reasonable beliefs; 
the other may offer a literal understanding of what is written and 
claim that it expresses bizarre beliefs. Such interpretive options arise 
ordinarily in less extreme form. But since we cannot foreclose on such 
options, the indeterminacy of interpretations is further reinforced. 
But there are constraints that rule out the unacceptable among 
interpretations that are consistent with what we can discover. Some of 
these constraints vary with the subject matter. For example, after all 
the available evidence has been accounted for, creative interpretations 
that will be acceptable in the context of literary art works will not be 
tolerated concerning historical documents. Or literal interpretations 
that are adopted about historical documents will not be admitted con­
cerning religious texts. 
However, even after the discovery of all the available evidence and 
the exclusion of unacceptable interpretations that are consistent with 
the evidence, there is no reason to believe that we shall have elimi­
nated all but one interpretation. Since interpreters cannot demon­
strate the validity of their interpretations even if their perspectives 
and conceptual frameworks are accepted, indeterminacy of interpreta­
tion undermines dogmatic claims on behalf of an accepted interpreta­
tion. At the same time. the constraints that rule out as unacceptable 
some interpretations determine that not every interpretation is given 
equal hearing. Specific.ally, interpretations that challenge all our 
beliefs will not be given a hearing. Since it is a precondition of inter, 
preting that what we interpret must be at least partially consistent and 
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contain or indicate beliefs that we can share, we cannot understand or 
interpret interpretations that challenge all our beliefs. Self ,defeating 
forms of skepticism and relativism are thereby effectivel}" repudiated . 
A fundamental Kantian insight remains after tht.> exdusion of dog­
matism. skepticism and rdativism. In the;- tradition of critical philo­
sophy our a priori concepts make the manifold of our intuitions intel­
ligible. If our surrounding world appears to us at all, it must appear 
within the limits of concepts that we contribute to our experience of 
che world. Kantian claims to the contrary, skeptics argued tradition­
aEly that the world may not be as it appears to us. Theories of inter­
pretation also hold that interpretations are offered in terms of con­
cepts that interpreters contribute to texts. It would seem that skeptics 
could also argue that texts merely appear to interpreters in certain 
ways, but there is a gap between what appears to be the case and what 
is the case. Interpretations are interpreters' stories about texts, but 
how can we know whether the story is indeed history? 
The answer to the skeptic is surprising: concerning interpretations 
that survive among available alternatives there is no difference 
between a story and history. Concerning natural events there may be a 
gap between a story and history, but texts have an intentional charac­
ter and they do not admit such a gap. "What message would anyone 
want to communicate with this text?" is an interpreter's first question. 
As soon as we introduce the presumed authors' or agents' aims and 
contemporary judgment about them in answering this question, we 
are telling a story about these agents. We provide a connection 
between the authors' and agents' aims, beliefs, desires and what they 
said or did. In telling such a story we leave the limits of what can be 
observed and we admit speculation and interpretation. Our story 
must compete with other stories that also admit speculation and 
interpretation, but there is nothing else we can compete with but 
other stories. History is but the surviving alternative among available 
stories. 
There is a second surprise in store for us. Texts that originated in 
historically remote times or geographically faraway places seemed to 
present special problems to interpreters. But if interpretive charity is 
not only recommended but a precondition of interpreting, then there 
are no differences in principle between interpreting those who are 
near to us and those who are far from us. We may encounter different 
practical problems in interpreting texts from the nearest and farthest 
sources, but these practical problems do not admit claims that those 
farthest away are radically different from those near to us. Wherever 
we succeed in interpreting, we assume that a given text we interpret 
contains or indicates at least a partially consistent and true set of 
beliefs. Wherever we encounter disagreement about beliefs, they are 
intelligible only against the background of shared beliefs. The pre� 
logical, the primitive, the savage and the fundamentally other do not 
exist.13  
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